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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
various state and local taxation issues. With respect to state taxa-
tion issues, the court examined the constitutionality of the Tele-
communications Excise Tax,' an exemption from the Retailers'
Occupation Tax,2 and procedures for issuing property tax refunds.'
The court's decisions regarding local taxation involved the consti-
tutionality of two home rule taxes: the City of Chicago fuel tax
and an amendment to the Chicago amusement tax.4
* Partner, Chapman and Cutler, Chicago, Illinois; B.B.A., 1977, University of Cin-
cinnati; J.D., 1980, Georgetown University Law Center; L.L.M., 1985, DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law.
** B.S., 1987, Arizona State University; J.D. candidate, 1990, Loyola University of
Chicago.
1. See infra notes 5-63 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 90-118 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 119-94 and accompanying text.
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 20
II. STATE TAXATION ISSUES
A. Constitutionality of Telecommunications Excise Tax
In Goldberg v. Johnson,5 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of an excise tax imposed on long distance tele-
phone calls.6 Section 4 of the Telecommunications Excise Tax Act
(the "TETA")7 imposes an excise tax on long distance telephone
calls that originate in or are received in Illinois, and that are paid
for in Illinois or billed to an Illinois address.8 The supreme court
held that the tax imposed by section 4 of the TETA does not vio-
late the Illinois Constitution or the United States Constitution. 9
In Goldberg, the plaintiffs ° filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Cook County against the Director of Revenue (the "Director")
and numerous long-distance carriers." The plaintiffs challenged
the excise tax as a violation of the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution 2 and the equal protection clauses of both the
United States 3 and the Illinois Constitutions.' 4 The circuit court
held that section 4 of the TETA is unconstitutional and, therefore,
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. '5 The Direc-
5. 117 Ill. 2d 493, 512 N.E.2d 1262 (1987) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom., Goldberg v.
Sweet, 109 S. Ct. 582 (1989).
6. Id. at 506-07, 512 N.E.2d at 1268-69.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2004 (1987).
8. Section 4 of the TETA states in pertinent part: "A tax is imposed upon the act or
privilege of originating in this state or receiving in this state interstate telecommunica-
tions by a person in this state at a rate of 5% of the gross charge for such telecommunica-
tions purchased at retail from a retailer by such person." Id.
9. Goldberg, 117 Ill. 2d at 506-07, 512 N.E.2d at 1268-69.
10. The plaintiffs were users of long distance service who filed a class action on behalf
of other long distance service users. Id. at 495, 512 N.E.2d at 1263.
11. Id. at 495-96, 512 N.E.2d at 1264.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion provides: "The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o regulate commerce ... among
the several states." Id.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution provides: "Nor shall any state... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
14. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2. The equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution
provides: "No person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the laws." Id.
15. Goldberg, 117 Ill. 2d at 497, 512 N.E.2d at 1264. The circuit court held that
section 4 of TETA violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution be-
cause the tax is accessed on the entire charge of a call and, thus, is unapportioned. Id. A
state tax is unapportioned when it is imposed upon an activity that occurs outside of that
state. Id. at 501, 512 N.E.2d at 1265. A state tax is apportioned when it applies only to
that portion of an activity which occurs within the state. Id. The court also held that the
excise tax violates the equal protection clause because it taxes calls initiated in Illinois and
paid for in Illinois, but not calls initiated in Illinois and paid for outside Illinois, thus
treating the two long distance callers differently. Id. at 497, 512 N.E.2d at 1264.
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tor then appealed the circuit court's decision directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court.
1 6
The supreme court first addressed the issue of whether section 4
of the TETA violates the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. 7 The Director argued that the excise tax constitutes
a retail tax on a local activity, rather than a tax on interstate com-
merce itself, because the amount of the tax is based on the cost of
the call."8 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the tax
was an unconstitutional levy on an interstate activity.' 9 The
supreme court declined to characterize the tax or to consider the
manner in which it is calculated to determine its effect on interstate
commerce.20 Instead, the supreme court stressed the substantive
effect of the tax and concluded that the tax, regardless of the name
given to it or the manner in which it is calculated, does affect inter-
state commerce.2'
The supreme court then adopted the test advocated by the
United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady22 to determine whether the excise tax affects interstate com-
merce in a prohibited manner.23 The Complete Auto test directs
that a tax affecting interstate commerce is constitutional if the fol-
lowing requirements are satisfied:
16. Id.
17. Id. at 500, 512 N.E.2d at 1265.
18. Id. at 498, 512 N.E.2d at 1265. The Director argued that the tax is simply im-
posed on the purchase of a call that takes place solely in Illinois, rather than a tax on the
call itself, which includes portions of a call in another state. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 499, 512 N.E.2d at 1265.
21. Id.
22. 430 U.S. 274, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) [hereinafter Complete Auto]. In
Complete Auto, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Mississippi tax imposed on a
Michigan corporation for the privilege of doing business in the State of Mississippi. Id. at
289. The appellant, a Michigan corporation, transported General Motors vehicles by
truck to dealers throughout Mississippi. Id. at 276. The State of Mississippi imposed a
tax, based on gross income, for the privilege of engaging in business within the state. Id.
at 275. The appellant challenged the tax based on Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,
340 U.S 602 (1951), which held that a state tax levied on the privilege of doing business
within a state is per se unconstitutional. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278. The Complete
Auto Court overruled Spector Motor Service, and held that a state may impose a tax on
the privilege of doing business within a state as long as the effect of the tax is not uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 289. The Court held that the tax was permissible because the appellant
made no claim that the tax affected interstate commerce in an unconstitutional manner.
Id. at 287-88. The Court noted that valid challenges to a state tax include the following:
The activity taxed is not adequately connected to the state; the tax is not related to bene-
fits provided by the state; the tax operates to discriminate against interstate commerce;
and the tax is not fairly apportioned. Id. at 287.
23. Goldberg, 117 Ill. 2d at 500, 512 N.E.2d at 1266.
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(1) there is a substantial nexus between the activity taxed and the
taxing state;
(2) the tax is fairly apportioned so that it is limited to that por-
tion of the interstate activity occurring within the taxing
state;
(3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce;
and
(4) the tax is fairly related to services provided by the taxing
state.24
Applying the Complete Auto test, the Illinois Supreme Court
summarily concluded that the State of Illinois has an adequate
nexus with the activity taxed, thus satisfying the first prong of the
test.25 The court noted that both the taxable event and the pay-
ment for the event must occur in Illinois before the excise tax is
imposed. 26 The court also stated that the tax is applied only to
calls that originate in or are received in Illinois, and that are billed
to Illinois service addresses.27 The supreme court concluded that
these connections were sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
Complete Auto test.28
The supreme court then determined whether the excise tax is
fairly apportioned to an activity that actually occurs in Illinois, as
required by the second prong of the Complete Auto test.29 The
court found that the excise tax applies to the entirety of each call
and, therefore, is an unapportioned tax.30 The court stated, how-
ever, that an unapportioned tax is not per se unconstitutional. 3'
The court explained that an unapportioned state tax is unconstitu-
tional only if it is discriminatory, by imposing multiple taxation or
creating the risk of multiple taxation.32 The court then stated that
24. Id. at 498, 512 N.E.2d at 1266.
25. Id. at 500-01, 512 N.E.2d at 1266.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 501-02, 512 N.E.2d at 1266. For a definition of apportionment, see supra
note 15.
30. Goldberg, 117 Ill. 2d at 501, 512 N.E.2d at 1266.
31. Id. The supreme court relied on Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Department of Rev-
enue, 125 Wis. 2d 339, 371 N.W. 2d 825 (1985), which held that a similar tax on long
distance telecommunications originating in Wisconsin and billed to a Wisconsin address
does not violate the commerce clause, although it was unapportioned. Id. at 347, 371
N.W.2d at 830.
32. Goldberg, 117 111. 2d at 500, 519 N.E.2d at 1266. The court explained that the
purpose of requiring apportionment is to guard against discrimination on interstate com-
merce. Id. The court stated that an unapportioned state tax imposed on an interstate
activity may subject the taxpayer to multiple taxation because other states could also
impose a tax on the same activity. Id.
[Vol. 20
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if a tax is nondiscriminatory, then the fact that it is unapportioned
is constitutionally irrelevant.33
Therefore, the supreme court immediately proceeded to discuss
whether section 4 of the TETA discriminates against interstate
commerce by posing the risk of multiple taxation. 4 The court
noted that the excise tax applies in two circumstances:
(1) the origination, in Illinois, of an interstate call which is paid
for in Illinois or billed to an address in Illinois; or
(2) the reception, in Illinois, of an interstate call which is billed
to an address in Illinois.35
Examining the first situation, the court found that although the tax
is unapportioned, no other taxing entity could levy a tax on the
call.36 The court, therefore, concluded that there is no risk of mul-
tiple taxation and, thus, no discrimination against interstate com-
merce in the first situation.37
The court then examined the situation in which the tax is im-
posed on a call received in Illinois.38 The court found that double
taxation could occur as a result of similar taxes levied by at least
two other jurisdictions. 39 The court noted, however, that section 4
provides for a tax credit in the event of multiple taxation.' As a
result, the supreme court found that the TETA remedies the con-
stitutional infirmity caused by possible multiple taxation.4' The
court, therefore, concluded that the excise tax meets the third
prong of the Complete Auto test.42
Finally, the court considered the fourth prong of the Complete
Auto test: whether the excise tax is fairly related to services pro-
vided by the taxing state to the taxpayers.4 3 Even though services
are provided by other states when a long distance call is made, the
33. Id.
34. Id. at 502-03, 525 N.E.2d at 1266-77. Apparently, the court was discussing the
third prong of the Complete Auto test. See supra text accompanying note 24.
35. Goldberg, 117 Ill. 2d at 502, 525 N.E.2d at 1266.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 503, 525 N.E.2d at 1267.
40. Id. Section 4 of the TETA states in pertinent part:
To prevent actual multi-state taxation of the act or privilege that is subject to
taxation under this paragraph, any taxpayer, upon proof that that taxpayer has
paid a tax in another state on such event, shall be allowed a credit against the
tax imposed in this section 4 to the extent of the amount of such tax properly
due and paid in such other state.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2004 (1987).
41. Goldberg, 117 Ill. 2d at 503, 525 N.E.2d at 1267.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 504, 512 N.E.2d at 1267.
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court found that Illinois provides substantial services which benefit
the taxpayer. 44 The court concluded that the benefits provided by
Illinois in the origination of an interstate call are fairly related to
the tax imposed; thus, section 4 of the TETA satisfies the fourth
prong of the Complete Auto test.45 The court, therefore, held that
the excise tax does not violate the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution.46
The supreme court then addressed the plaintiffs' contention that
the excise tax violates the equal protection clause of both the
United States and the Illinois Constitutions.47  The plaintiffs
claimed that the exemption from tax of calls originating in Illinois
but paid for outside of Illinois is arbitrary and irrational and, there-
fore, violates equal protection.48 The plaintiffs contended that per-
sons making long distance calls in Illinois engage in the same
activity regardless of where the charge is billed.49 Therefore, the
plaintiffs argued, long distance callers who are similarly situated
are treated differently without a rational reason for the disparate
50taxation.
The supreme court stated that a tax will withstand an equal pro-
tection challenge if "there is any set of circumstances under which
the legislative classification is, in fact, a rational exercise of the
State's authority to tax."'" The court stated that the group whose
calls are exempt from taxation would most likely be made up of
nonresidents who would not receive substantial benefit from the
tax. 52 The group that is taxed, however, would most likely be
made up of Illinois residents who do receive benefits from the tax.53
The court, therefore, found that the distinction between the two
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 504, 512 N.E.2d at 1268.
47. Id. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
48. Goldberg, 117 Ill. 2d at 505, 512 N.E.2d at 1268. Examples of such calls include
collect phone calls and credit-card calls billed to addresses in other states. Id. The plain-
tiffs asserted that there is no distinction between calls originating in Illinois, whether the
calls are paid for inside or outside of Illinois. 1d.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 505-06, 512 N.E.2d at 1268 (citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973); Hoffmann v. Clark, 69 Ill. 2d 402, 425, 372 N.E.2d 74, 85
(1977); Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 53 Ill. 2d 421, 425, 292 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1973)).
52. Id. The court reached this conclusion because the calls that are exempt from tax
are calls that are paid for outside Illinois. Id. In addition, the court stated that a tax on
calls paid for outside of Illinois lacks the appropriate nexus to the state necessary to
impose the tax. Id.
53. Id. The court reached this conclusion because the charge for calls that are taxed
is paid in Illinois. Id.
[Vol. 20
Taxation: State and Local
groups of callers is rational.54 Accordingly, the court held that sec-
tion 4 of the TETA does not violate the equal protection clause of
either the United States or the Illinois Constitution. 55
The supreme court's decision in Goldberg is extremely impor-
tant. The Goldberg decision, coupled with an appellate court deci-
sion in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Department of Revenue,56
clearly indicates that the Illinois courts have rejected the "taxable
moment" theory as a predicate to the imposition of excise and use
taxes." In its place, the supreme court had adopted the four-prong
test in Complete Auto as the sole test of the constitutionality of a
taxing statute under the commerce clause. In affirming the
Goldberg decision and an earlier decision in D.H. Holmes Co. v.
McNamara,5s the United States Supreme Court has placed its im-
primatur on this analysis.59
The practical effect of the Goldberg decision will be the explora-
tion of avenues of attack, other than the commerce clause, on use
taxes and similar taxes, such as excise taxes. The supreme court's
decision last term in Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue,6° in which the court, for the first time, indicated that the
uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution provides more protec-
tion than the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, provides taxpayers with such an avenue - the uniformity
clause of the Illinois Constitution. Taxpayers' arguments relying
on the uniformity clause will increase significantly because of the
Goldberg decision, particularly in light of the Searle court's radical
departure from past precedent.
A final comment should be made with respect to the manner in
which the supreme court blurred the fair apportionment and dis-
crimination prongs of the Complete Auto test.6 ' The United States
Supreme Court recognized this confusion in the beginning of the
54. Id.
55. Id. at 506, 512 N.E.2d at 1268-69.
56. 170 Il1. App. 3d 1014, 524 N.E.2d 1010 (1st Dist. 1988).
57. The "taxable moment" theory was adopted by the courts as recently as 1975. See
Sundstrand Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 34 Ill. App. 3d 694, 698, 339 N.E.2d 351,
354 (2d Dist. 1975) (a taxable moment had occurred within the state with respect to
airplanes that taxpayer argued had been committed to interstate commerce before com-
ing to rest in Illinois).
58. 108 S. Ct. 1619 (1988).
59. Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S. Ct. 582 (1989). The Supreme Court's view that the
Complete Auto test is the only predicate to use taxation is evidenced by the listing of cases
contained in footnote 12 of the majority opinion. Id. at 588 n.12.
60. 117 I11. 2d 454, 512 N.E.2d 1240 (1987), reh'g denied, Oct. 5, 1987.
61. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
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Goldberg opinion,62 but the Court ultimately found that fair appor-
tionment did exist because "the risk of multiple taxation is low,
and actual multiple taxation is precluded by the credit provi-
sion."'63 The Court clearly recognizes the two separate prongs, but
its holding raises the question of whether, in the event of a high
probability of multiple taxation, a credit mechanism will satisfy the
fair apportionment prong of the Complete Auto test. Due to its
treatment of the fair apportionment and discrimination prongs as,
in essence, a single question, the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis
does not provide a clear indication of the court's view on this
question.
B. Retailers' Occupation Tax Act - Vending Machine Sales
In Canteen Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 64 the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that sales of certain foods purchased from
vending machines fall within an exemption from tax under the Re-
tailers' Occupation Tax Act (the "ROTA").65 Section 2 of the
ROTA imposes a 4% tax on the gross receipts of retail sales of
tangible personal property.66 Section 2 of the ROTA specifically
provides that food prepared for consumption off of the premises
where it is sold is subject to a reduced rate of tax.67 Section 2 fur-
ther provides that the reduced tax rate does not apply to "food
which has been prepared for immediate consumption. '68 In addi-
tion, the Department of Revenue (the "Department") had promul-
gated a regulation under the ROTA which stated that all food sold
from vending machines is food sold for immediate consumption
and, therefore, not subject to the reduced tax rate.69
62. Goldberg, 109 S. Ct. at 591.
63. Id.
64. 123 Ill. 2d 95, 525 N.E.2d 73 (1988).
65. Id. at 112, 525 N.E.2d at 80; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 441 (1987).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 441 (1987). Section 2 of the ROTA provides in
pertinent part that "[a] tax is imposed upon persons engaged in the business of selling
tangible personal property at retail at the rate of 4% of the gross receipts from such sales
of tangible personal property made in the course of such business." Id.
67. Id. Section 2 of the ROTA provides in pertinent part:
[W]ith respect to food for human consumption which is to be consumed off the
promises where it is sold (other than alcoholic beverages and food which has
been prepared for immediate consumption). .. such tax shall be imposed at the
rate of 3% for the sales or purchases on and after January 1, 1980 and before
January 1 1981, and at the rate of 2% on and after January 1, 1981.
Id.
68. Id.
69. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 130.310 (1985). Section 12 of the ROTA authorizes
the Department to promulgate regulations relating to the ROTA. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
120, para. 451 (1987). The Department regulation provides in pertinent part that:
[Vol. 20
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In Canteen Corp., the plaintiff, a retail seller of food and bever-
ages through vending machines, filed a request with the Depart-
ment for a credit from an overpayment of the retailers' occupation
tax.70 The plaintiff contended that a large portion of its sales
should be taxed at the reduced rate because certain food items sold
from its vending machines were not food that was prepared for
immediate consumption.71 After an administrative hearing, the
Department denied the plaintiff's claim based on the regulation.72
The Circuit Court of Cook County reversed the decision of the
Department because it could not find a justification for imposing a
higher tax rate on sales from vending machines when the identical
items sold in grocery stores were subject to the reduced rate.73 The
circuit court, therefore, concluded that the Department's regula-
tion was inconsistent with section 2 of the ROTA and that the
regulation violated the uniformity clause of the Illinois
Constitution."4
The Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Moran,
considered two issues on direct appeal." First, the supreme court
determined whether all food purchases from vending machines
qualify as sales of food prepared for immediate consumption as de-
fined by the Department's regulation.76 Second, the supreme court
considered the definition of "premises" under the ROTA, and
whether the plaintiff properly proved that the food in question was
consumed off the premises.77
To determine whether the Department regulation was consistent
2) Gross receipts from sales of food for which facilities are provided so that it
can be consumed on the premises where it is sold and gross receipts from sales
of food which has been prepared for immediate consumption do not qualify for
the reduced rate. For example:
C) Sales of food items in vending machines are sales of food for immediate
consumption.
Id. (emphasis added).
70. Canteen Corp., 123 Ill. 2d at 98, 525 N.E.2d at 74.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 102-03, 525 N.E.2d at 76.
73. Id. at 99, 525 N.E.2d at 74.
74. Id. The uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution states: "In any law classify-
ing the subjects or objects of nonproperty taxes of fees, the classes shall be reasonable and
the subjects and objects within each class shall be taxed uniformly. Exemptions, deduc-
tions, credits, refunds and other allowances shall be reasonable." ILL. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2.
75. Canteen Corp., 123 Ill. 2d at 99, 525 N.E.2d at 74-75.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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with the ROTA, the supreme court first considered the meaning of
the statutory phrase "prepared for immediate consumption. "78
The court looked to the plain and common meaning of the word
"prepare" and determined that it refers to the manufacturing of
food, and not the actual sale of the food. 9 The supreme court also
determined that the term "immediate," as used in the ROTA, re-
fers to "food made ready to be eaten without substantial delay."80
The court differentiated between food consumed immediately after
preparation and food consumed immediately after purchase, not-
ing that food prepared for placement into vending machines does
not, in all cases, constitute food for immediate consumption.8"
Applying its interpretation of the statutory terms, the supreme
court found that the majority of the plaintiff's vending machine
sales were not sales of food prepared for immediate consumption.12
The supreme court based its finding on the fact that there was a
substantial delay between the final stage of the food's preparation
and the food's ultimate consumption.83 The supreme court con-
cluded that because the Department's regulation did not base its
determination of whether consumption is immediate on the final
stage of food preparation, the regulation improperly extended the
scope of the ROTA. 4
The supreme court then considered whether the plaintiff proved
that the food in question was consumed off the premises from
78. Id.
79. Id. at 105, 525 N.E.2d at 77. The supreme court stated that "[tihe meaning of
'prepared' [does not] include the placing of food on a shelf or in a vending machine ....
The sale and merchandising of food may be necessary to its eventual consumption but
they are not necessary to its preparation." Id. (emphasis in original).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 106, 525 N.E.2d at 77.
82. Id. at 107, 525 N.E.2d at 78. The supreme court, however, found that the hot
foods sold from the plaintiff's vending machines did not reach the final stage of prepara-
tion until they were heated after the sale. Id. Therefore, these items were properly taxed
at the higher tax rate. Id. In addition, the supreme court noted that the record was
unclear as to when the wrapped sandwiches and fruit sold in the vending machines were
"prepared." Id. As a result, the supreme court found that the plaintiff had not met its
burden of proof as to these items and, therefore, the items were taxed at the higher rate.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 108, 525 N.E.2d at 78-79. The court dismissed the Department's argument
that the regulation was consistent with the legislature's intent to avoid a regressive tax.
Id. at 103, 525 N.E.2d at 76. The Department contended that to effect this end, the
legislature intended to tax necessities at a lower rate than luxury items. Id. The Depart-
ment further argued that food purchased from vending machines was more likely to be
for "immediate refreshment" than at home family consumption. Id. The court failed to
except these distinctions as relevant to differential tax treatment of the same or similar
food items. Id. at 108-09, 525 N.E.2d at 79.
[Vol. 20
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which it was sold.8 5 The supreme court defined "premises," in the
context of vending machine sales, as "the area over which the ven-
dor exercises control" and "the area in which facilities for eating
are provided. '8 6 The supreme court concluded that the plaintiff's
claim accurately reflected this definition of "premises" and, there-
fore, could not be denied. 7
Finally, the supreme court declined to address the plaintiff's
uniformity clause argument. 8  The supreme court stated that be-
cause it held that the regulation was inconsistent with section 2 of
the ROTA, no constitutional issue remained.8 9
The court's decision in Canteen Corp. states the obvious: admin-
istrative agencies do not have the power to extend the scope of a
statute through the use of their rule-making power. The decision is
not otherwise particularly noteworthy. Even though Canteen
Corp. involves, at least for the general public, a relatively obscure
question, it represents a breath of fresh air in this era of state fiscal
problems in which the courts appear to have adopted pro-revenue
raising sympathies.
C. Methods for Refunding an Overpayment of Property Tax
In Lake County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board of
Illinois,9° the Illinois Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether
an abatement of current property tax liability owed to a county, in
an amount owed to a taxpayer as a result of an overpayment of
property taxes, constitutes the giving of a "refund" under section
111.4 of the Revenue Act.91 The supreme court held that this pro-
cedure is permissible to collect property taxes due from a taxpayer
85. Id. at 109-10, 525 N.E.2d at 79-80.
86. Id. at 111, 525 N.E.2d at 80. The supreme court rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion that "premises" are limited solely to the area over which the vendor exercises con-
trol. Id. at 110, 525 N.E.2d at 80. The supreme court also rejected the Department's
contention that "premises" include the entire building in which a vending machine is
located. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 112, 525 N.E.2d at 80. For the text of the uniformity clause, see supra note
74.
89. Id.
90. 119 Ill. 2d 419, 519 N.E.2d 459 (1988).
91. Id. at 423, 519 N.E.2d at 461. Section 111.4 of the Revenue Act states in perti-
nent part: "[A]ny taxes extended upon such unauthorized assessment or part thereof
shall be abated or if already paid shall be refunded with interest as provide in section
194." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 592.4 (1987). Section 194 of the Revenue Act
states in pertinent part: "Refunds... shall be made by the collector in accordance with
the final orders of the Property Tax Appeal Board or the Court." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
120, para. 675 (1987).
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and simultaneously refund an overpayment of property taxes for
the same property.92
The taxpayer, Marriott Corporation ("Marriott"), as a result of
previous litigation, 93 received a reduced assessment of its 1981
property taxes on the Great America Theme Park.94 In response
to the entry of judgment, the Lake County Collector (the "Collec-
tor") reduced the property tax assessment due from Marriott for
its 1982 and 1983 property taxes by the amount of the reduction in
Marriott's 1981 taxes. 95 Upon notice of this procedure, Marriott
filed a motion to enforce the previous order by requiring the Col-
lector to issue a refund check. 96 The circuit court denied the mo-
tion, ruling that the Collector had complied with the original
order.97 The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision, 98
and Marriott appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Marriott argued that the abatement procedure used by the Col-
lector violated the statutory refund procedure. 99 To determine
whether the procedure is proper, the supreme court stated that the
term "refund" must be given its ordinary and properly understood
meaning and not its most narrow meaning."°° The court found
that, in spite of the understanding that a refund commonly in-
volves the issuance of a check or cash, the statutory definition of
refund includes the offsetting of a current obligation with the
amount of a tax overpayment."° ' The court, therefore, concluded
92. Lake County Bd. of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 431, 519 N.E.2d at 465.
93. See Lake County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 140 Ill. App. 3d
1042, 489 N.E.2d 446 (2d Dist. 1986).
94. Lake County Bd. of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 421-22, 519 N.E.2d at 460. In addition
to affirming the reduced assessment, the appellate court remanded the case to the circuit
court to grant appropriate relief to Marriott. Id. Marriott then filed a motion for entry
of judgment and to order the Collector to issue a refund check. Id. at 422, 519 N.E.2d at
460. The circuit court granted this motion and entered judgment for Marriott. Id. at
422, 519 N.E.2d at 461.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Lake County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 152 Ill. App. 3d 1093,
504 N.E.2d 1333 (2d Dist. 1987).
99. Lake County Bd. of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 422, 519 N.E.2d at 461. For the lan-
guage of the statutes governing refunds of property taxes to taxpayers, see supra note 91.
100. Id. at 423, 519 N.E.2d at 461. See also Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 366,
487 N.E.2d 937, 942 (1985) (term must be given its ordinary and popularly understood
meaning); Mahon v. Nudelman, 377 Ill. 331, 335, 36 N.E.2d 550, 552 (1941) (term must
be given its full meaning, not the narrowest meaning of which it is susceptible).
101. Lake County Bd. of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 424, 519 N.E.2d at 461-62. Marriott
disputed whether its 1982 and 1983 tax obligations were, in fact, current obligations. Id.
at 424, 519 N.E.2d at 462. The supreme court, however, found that the tax obligations
had accrued at the time of the setoff, even though Marriott was not obligated to submit
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that the procedure employed by the Collector is within the statu-
tory definition of a "refund."' °2
Even though the supreme court concluded that the procedure
used falls within in the definition of the word "refund," it further
analyzed whether the Collector's actions were proper under the
circumstances.' 3 The supreme court stated that because the pro-
cedure used by the Collector is not expressly prescribed by the
Revenue Act, the court must determine whether:
(1) the legislature has provided sufficient standards to control
the collection activities at issue;
(2) the collector exceeded the bounds of those standards; and
(3) Marriott was denied due process of law by the particular col-
lection procedure utilized." °
The court found that the Illinois General Assembly had lawfully
empowered the Collector to collect the tax in question. 0 5 Further-
more, the supreme court concluded that the legislature had
promulgated adequate rules for the Collector to follow. 0 6
The supreme court then stated that a legislative grant of power
carries with it the authority to do all that is reasonably necessary to
carry out that power.0 7 The court further stated that an adminis-
trative officer may lawfully exercise discretion to accomplish gener-
ally authorized powers.' 8  The supreme court, therefore,
summarily agreed with the appellate court that the Collector's ac-
tions represent a reasonable means of accomplishing his broad leg-
payment immediately. Id. at 425, 519 N.E.2d at 462. The supreme court also noted that
had the collector offset the refund against an obligation that had not yet accrued, the
argument could be made that the Collector merely issued a credit rather then a refund.
Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 426-27, 519 N.E.2d at 462.
104. Id. at 426-27, 519 N.E.2d at 463.
105. Id. at 427, 519 N.E.2d at 463. The power of the Collector to collect the tax is
conferred by section 190 of the Revenue Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 671 (1987).
The supreme court stated that this arrangement was "a lawful delegation of authority to
an administrative agency." Lake County Bd. of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 427, 519 N.E.2d at
463. The court acknowledged that the legislature may delegate authority to an adminis-
trative agency with only general guidelines as to application, leaving specific procedures
to the "reasonable discretion" of the agency. Id.
106. Lake County Bd. of Review, 119 IIl. 2d at 427, 519 N.E.2d at 463.
107. Id. (citing Townsend v. Gash, 267 Ill. 578, 584, 108 N.E. 744, 746 (1915)). The
court then stated that the word "necessary" means " 'absolutely necessary,' 'indispensa-
ble,' or, less restrictively, 'expedient' or 'reasonably convenient.' " Id. at 427-28, 519
N.E.2d at 463 (citing Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fox, 402 Ill. 617, 631, 85 N.E.2d 43, 51
(1949)).
108. Id. at 428, 519 N.E.2d at 463 (citing City of Chicago v. Town Underground
Theatre, Inc., 9 Ill. App. 3d 930, 936, 293 N.E.2d 367, 372 (1st Dist. 1973)).
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islative power.'19
Finally, the supreme court considered whether the collection
procedure used denied Marriott due process of law.11° Marriott
argued that the procedure used by the collector wrongfully de-
prived it of its property because Marriott was not issued a refund
check.11' The supreme court concluded, after brief analysis, that
because the Collector applied the refund against a legitimate, cur-
rently due liability, Marriott was not deprived of its refund
entitlement. " 2
In addition, Marriott argued that it was deprived of its right to
protest the tax rate on the increased assessment for 1982 and
1983.113 The supreme court dismissed this argument because the
tax rate is determined annually and, therefore, Marriott had an
opportunity to challenge the rate when it was applied to the origi-
nal assessment. "4 The court explained that due process guarantees
Marriott an opportunity to contest the tax rate before being re-
quired to pay the tax; 1I5 however, due process does not require that
Marriott get another chance to contest the tax rate when it is ap-
plied to an increased assessment." 6 Accordingly, the court found
that in this situation, the abatement procedure used by the Collec-
tor did not violate due process. 117
The importance of the court's decision lies in the court's use of a
three-prong test to determine whether an administrative officer's
action in the interstices created by the statutory provisions of a
revenue statute are lawful. Not only are there matters under the
Revenue Act, procedural or otherwise, that are not dealt with
therein, but similar situations exist under most, if not all, of the
state's taxing provisions. Even though the court did not rigorously
apply each prong of the test, it reaffirmed that there are limits to
the actions of administrative agencies and their officials. In this
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 429, 519 N.E.2d at 464.
114. Id. at 429-30, 519 N.E.2d at 464. The court noted that Marriott had not re-
quested a stay of the Property Tax Appeal Board decision; thus, the decision was binding
on the collector. Id. In addition, pursuant to section 592.4 of the Revenue Act, appeal of
a decision does not stay the decision. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 592.4 (1987). The
court also noted that Marriott was in the process of appealing the increased assessment.
Lake County Bd. of Review, 119 I11. 2d at 429, 519 N.E.2d at 464.
115. Lake County Bd. of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 429, 519 N.E.2d at 464.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 431, 519 N.E.2d at 465.
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vein, this decision and the court's decision in Canteen Corp. 11 pro-
vide the same message to the Illinois Department of Revenue.
III. LOCAL TAXATION ISSUES
A. The City of Chicago Fuel Tax
In Illinois Gasoline Dealers Association v. City of Chicago, 1 9 the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld a Chicago ordinance that imposes a
per gallon tax on fuel purchased within the City of Chicago. 2'
The supreme court held that the fuel tax imposed by the City is not
an unauthorized occupation tax,1 2 1 and that it does not violate the
equal protection clause 2 2 or the uniformity clause 123 of the Illinois
Constitution. 24
The fuel tax is imposed pursuant to the Chicago Vehicle Fuel
Tax Ordinance (the "Ordinance")' 2 5 adopted by the Chicago City
Council. 26 The Ordinance imposes a five cent tax on each gallon
of fuel purchased in Chicago. 27 The Ordinance provides that the
tax is to be paid by the fuel purchaser;1 2 however, fuel dealers are
responsible for the collection of the tax, maintenance of records
concerning its collection, and are liable for nonpayment.12 9
The plaintiffs, the Illinois Gas Dealers Association and the Mid-
west Petroleum Marketers Association, challenged the Ordinance
118. For a discussion of Canteen Corp., see supra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
119. 119 Ill. 2d 391, 519 N.E.2d 447 (1988) [hereinafter Illinois Gasoline Dealers].
120. Id. at 404-05, 519 N.E.2d at 453.
121. Id. at 401, 519 N.E.2d at 450. For the definition of an occupation tax, see infra
text accompanying note 136.
122. For the text of the equal protection clause, see supra note 14.
123. For the text of the uniformity clause, see supra note 74.
124. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 391, 519 N.E.2d at 447.
125. Id. at 395, 519 N.E.2d at 448. The tax resulted from an amendment to chapter
200.10 of the Municipal Code of Chicago creating the Chicago. Fuel Tax Ordinance.
Chapter 200.10-2 states in pertinent part:
A tax is hereby imposed upon the privilege of purchasing or using, in the City of
Chicago, vehicle fuel purchased in a sale at retail. The tax shall be at a rate of
five cents per gallon of vehicle fuel. The ultimate incidence of and liability for
payment of the tax shall be upon the purchaser or user of the vehicle fuel, and
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impose a tax upon the occupation
of selling or distributing vehicle fuel. It shall be a violation of this chapter for
any distributor or retail dealer to fail to add this tax to the retail price of vehicle
fuel or to absorb the tax. This tax shall be in addition to any and all other taxes.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 200.10-2 (1986).
126. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 395, 519 N.E.2d at 448.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 395, 519 N.E.2d at 450.
129. Id.
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in the Circuit Court of Cook County.1 30 The circuit court upheld
the Ordinance and the plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme
Court of Illinois. 13
1
The plaintiffs challenged the Ordinance on several grounds.1 32
Primarily, the plaintiffs argued that the fuel tax is an unauthorized
occupation tax in violation of the Illinois Constitution. 3 3  The
plaintiffs also argued that the Ordinance results in unconstitutional
multiple taxation. 134
In addressing these arguments, the supreme court considered
whether the Ordinance creates a constitutionally impermissible oc-
cupation tax. 1 35 The court stated that a tax is an occupation tax if
"it regulates and controls a given occupation, or imposes a tax for
the privilege of engaging in a given occupation, trade or profession,
or finally, whether it imposes a tax on the privilege of engaging in
the business of selling services."' 36  Applying this definition, the
court found that the Ordinance does not regulate or control a given
130. Id. at 395, 519 N.E.2d at 448. The plaintiffs filed separate complaints that were
consolidated in the circuit court. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 396, 519 N.E.2d at 449. The plaintiffs claimed that the Ordinance dele-
gates "powers of 'determination' [which] permit executive discretion" to the city comp-
troller. Id. at 397, 519 N.E.2d at 449. The plaintiffs further contended that the Illinois
Supreme Court has narrowly viewed such delegations of taxing power. Id. (citing
Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 Ill. 25, 95 N.E. 84 (1950)).
Addressing the plaintiffs' claim that the Ordinance is an invalid delegation of taxing
power, the supreme court found that the Ordinance vests the comptroller with no discre-
tion as to who will be taxed. Id. at 397-98, 519 N.E.2d at 449. See Paper Supply Co. v.
City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 553, 579, 317 N.E.2d 3, 16 (1974) ("factual determinations by
administrative agencies of officials . . . result] in neither an unlawful delegation of au-
thority nor the improper exercise of a judicial function"). But see Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (delegation of power to the Comptroller General
requiring "sophisticated economic judgment" is an exercise of excessive authority and
therefore invalid). The court, instead, found that the comptroller makes solely factual
determinations as to the collection of revenues. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at
397-98, 519 N.E.2d at 449.
The court also stated that the plaintiffs' claim that the Ordinance permits the comp-
troller to determine the rate of tax is not supported by the language of the Ordinance. Id.
at 398, 519 N.E.2d at 449-50.
133. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 396, 519 N.E.2d at 449. The Illinois
Constitution provides that a "home rule unit" (a city or town) may exercise any power
pertaining to its government, including taxation. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). An excep-
tion to this general grant of power is that a home rule unit cannot impose a tax upon
income or occupations unless the Illinois General Assembly specifically authorizes the
tax. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e).
134. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 396, 519 N.E.2d at 449.
135. Id. at 398-99, 519 N.E.2d at 450.
136. Id. at 399, 519 N.E.2d at 450 (citing Reifv. Barrett, 355 Il. 104, 109, 188 N.E.
889, 892 (1933); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45, 62, 432 N.E.2d
227, 234 (1982)).
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occupation. 137 In addition, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim
that the Ordinance has the "practical effect" of regulating an
occupation. 138
The plaintiffs asserted that even though the ordinance requires
tax payment by fuel purchasers, placing the burden of collecting,
documenting, and remitting the tax on the sellers actually creates
an unauthorized occupation tax.1 39 Relying heavily on Commer-
cial National Bank v. City of Chicago,140 the plaintiffs argued that
placing the incidence of the tax on the purchasers of the fuel did
not disguise the true nature of the tax, that of an occupation tax on
the privilege of engaging in the sale of gasoline. 141
Before the court analyzed whether the practical effect analysis
was relevant, it analyzed whether the fuel tax was the type of tax
that the Illinois constitutional convention intended to allow home
rule units to impose. 142 The court relied on the view of the consti-
tutional convention as expressed in the Illinois constitutional de-
bates. 4 3  The court concluded from these debates that the
convention intended to allow a home rule tax on the retail sale of
tangible goods.' 44 The court cited a report of the Local Govern-
ment Committee listing a per gallon fuel tax as an example of per-
missible home rule taxation.145  The court distinguished
Commercial National Bank, finding that the fuel tax is a tax that
the convention did not intend to deny home rule units.146 The
court, therefore, concluded that the "practical effect" analysis did
not apply to the fuel tax, and that the tax is not an impermissible
137. Id. at 399-400, 519 N.E.2d at 450.
138. Id.
139. Id. For a discussion of the Illinois constitutional limitation on home rule unit
taxation, see supra note 133.
140. 89 Ill. 2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982).
141. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 I11. 2d at 399-400, 519 N.E.2d at 450. The plain-
tiffs argued that the supreme court's decision in Commercial National Bank controlled.
In Commercial National Bank, the supreme court held that the practical effect of a tax on
services resulted in an unlawful occupation tax. Commercial Natl Bank, 89 Ill. 2d at 70,
432 N.E.2d at 244.
142. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 400-01, 519 N.E.2d at 451.
143. Id.
144. Id. In Commercial National Bank, the court also considered the 1970 Illinois
constitutional convention debates which indicated that the limitation on home rule taxa-
tion was intended to prohibit taxes on services. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 89 Ill. 2d at 68,
432 N.E.2d at 227.
145. 7 Record of Proceedings, SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONVENTION, at 1655-56 (1970).
146. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 400-01, 519 N.E.2d at 451. See infra
notes 177-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Ryan's concurring opin-
ion in Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 124 I11. 2d 1, 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988).
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occupation tax.147
The supreme court also addressed the plaintiffs' claim that the
Ordinance results in a violation of uniformity of taxation. 48 The
court stated that legislative bodies have broad powers in classifying
the objects of taxation, and that such classifications are constitu-
tional if they are reasonable. 4 9 In addition, the court stated that
there is a presumption in favor of legislative classifications, and the
burden of proving that a classification is unreasonable rests on the
plaintiff. 5 ° The court, applying this standard, stated that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the alleged classification is arbi-
trary. 5' The court, therefore, held that the Ordinance is
constitutional. 5 2
B. Amendment to Chicago Amusement Tax Ordinance
In Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur,'53 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that an amendment to the Chicago Amusement Tax
Ordinance (the "Amendment")' 54 violated the Illinois Constitution
by creating an unauthorized occupation tax. 55 The Chicago
Amusement Tax Ordinance imposes a tax on the patrons of amuse-
ments within the City of Chicago for the privilege of participating
147. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 401, 519 N.E.2d at 451. The court also
stated that its conclusion is consistent with other cases upholding home rule taxes. Id.
(citing Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 Ill. 2d 10, 357 N.E.2d 118
(1976); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 111. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975); S. Bloom, Inc. v. Kor-
shak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972)).
148. Id. at 401-03, 519 N.E.2d at 451. The plaintiffs claimed that the fuel tax is
unconstitutional because "it singles out a single subclass of retail purchases of tangible
personality to the exclusion of all others." Id. at 402, 519 N.E.2d at 451 (citing Fiorito v.
Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 531, 535-36, 236 N.E.2d 698, 701-02 (1968)). The plaintiffs also argued
that "uniformity of taxation is violated by double taxation." Id. at 402, 519 N.E.2d at
452 (citing People ex reL Hanrahan v. Caliendo, 50 Ill. 2d 72, 83, 277 N.E.2d 319, 326
(1971)). See also ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("[i]n any law classifying the subjects or ob-
jects of non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and
objects within each class shall be taxed uniformly"). The supreme court called the plain-
tiffs argument a "rather ambiguous argument against 'double taxation' stem[ming] from
the constitutional mandate that taxation shall be uniform." Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119
Ill. 2d at 402, 519 N.E.2d at 452.
149. Illinois Gasoline Dealers, 119 I11. 2d at 403, 519 N.E.2d at 452 (citing Lehn-
hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973)).
150. Id. (citing Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 53 Ill. 2d 421, 293 N.E.2d 401 (1973)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 124 I11. 2d 1, 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988).
154. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 104-1 to 104-8 (1985).
155. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 15, 528 N.E.2d at 984-85. For an explana-
tion of occupation taxes, see supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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in or viewing the amusement.1 56 The Amendment expanded the
scope of the Chicago Amusement Tax Ordinance to include health
and racquetball clubs in its definition of amusements, thereby im-
posing a tax on the membership dues of such clubs.'57 The
Amendment imposed the responsibility for collecting, recording,
and remitting the tax on the owners and operators of the clubs.'58
The Amendment further provided that the owners and operators
were liable for payment of the tax if their members failed to do
SO. 159
The plaintiffs, various health club owners and members, chal-
lenged the tax in the Circuit Court of Cook County, claiming that
the Amendment created an impermissible occupation tax."6 The
defendants, the City of Chicago and various officers, filed a motion
to dismiss the claim, contending that the tax was constitutional.' 61
The plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the collection of the tax until disposition of the case, and the circuit
court granted the injunction. 162 The appellate court reversed, find-
ing that the Amendment was constitutional in all respects. 63 The
plaintiffs then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. 164
The supreme court considered whether the plaintiffs' motion for
156. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 104-1 to 104-8 (1985).
157. Id. The City of Chicago Amusement Tax Ordinance was amended December
23, 1985, to include the following within the definition of an amusement: "[Any en-
tertainment or recreational activity offered for the public participation or on a member-
ship or other basis including but not limited to racquetball or health clubs, carnivals,
amusement park rides and games, bowling, billiard and pool games, dancing, tennis, rac-
quetball, swimming, weightlifting, body building or similar activities." Id. (emphasis
added).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 4, 528 N.E.2d at 979. The plaintiffs argued
that the tax imposed by the Amendment was an unauthorized occupation tax in violation
of article VII section 6(e)(2) of the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 7-8, 528 N.E.2d at 981;
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e)(2). Section 6(e)(2) prohibits home rule units from imposing
occupation taxes without authorization from the legislature. Id. The plaintiffs also as-
serted that the Amendment violates the uniformity clause and the equal protection clause
of the Illinois Constitution. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
161. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 4, 528 N.E.2d at 979. The defendants ar-
gued that the tax was not an occupation tax because it was imposed on the patrons and
not the owners of the clubs. Id. at 15, 528 N.E.2d at 984.
162. Id. at 4-5, 528 N.E.2d at 979. The circuit court found that the Amendment
created an unauthorized occupation tax in violation of article VII, section 6(e)(2) of the
Illinois Constitution. Id. The circuit court also found that the amendment was unconsti-
tutionally vague and that it violated the due process clause of both the Illinois and United
States Constitutions. Id. at 5, 528 N.E.2d at 979.
163. See Chicago Health Clubs v. Picur, 155 Ill. App. 3d 482, 508 N.E.2d 742 (1st
Dist. 1987).
164. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 5, 528 N.E.2d at 980.
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preliminary injunction was properly granted by the circuit court.165
In doing so, the court addressed whether the tax on health club
memberships was unconstitutional as an unauthorized occupation
tax. 166 The supreme court stated that even though a statute recites
that a tax is imposed on a purchaser, rather than on a seller, the
tax may still be an occupation tax. 167 The court also stated that the
"practical operation and effect" of the tax must be considered in
determining whether a tax is an occupation tax. 168  The court
found that the practical effect of the Amendment was not only to
place the burden of collecting and remitting the tax on the owners
of the clubs, but also to place the ultimate burden of payment on
the owners. 169  The court, therefore, concluded that the Amend-
ment created an occupation tax on the provision of health club
services. 170
The court also briefly addressed the contention of the defendants
165. Id. at 7-8, 528 N.E.2d at 981.
166. The supreme court stated that "[i]n appealing the grant of the preliminary in-
junction and the denial of the motion to dismiss, defendants argued only the likelihood of
success on the merits, Le., they focused on the constitutionality of the amendment." Id.
The court did not discuss the other requirements for granting a preliminary injunction:
(1) that no adequate remedy at law exists; and (2) that failure to grant the injunction
would expose plaintiffs to irreparable harm. Id. at 7, 528 N.E.2d at 981 (citing Central
Bldg. & Cleaning Co. v. Vodnansky, 84 I11. App. 3d 586, 406 N.E.2d 32 (1st Dist. 1980)).
167. Id. at 9-10, 528 N.E.2d at 981-82. The supreme court noted that the purpose for
prohibiting occupation taxes was to prevent home rule units from evading the constitu-
tional restriction prohibiting income based taxes by labeling them occupation taxes. Id.
at 10, 528 N.E.2d at 982. In addition, the court stressed that labeling a tax as one im-
posed on purchasers of a service does not make the tax constitutionally permissible. Id.
(citing Commercial Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 22 (1982)).
For a discussion of Commercial National Bank, see supra notes 140-46 and accompany-
ing text.
168. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 10, 528 N.E.2d at 982.
169. Id. The court found that the Amendment mandated that owners were "respon-
sible for paying the tax to the city regardless of whether their patrons fail or refuse to
remit the tax." Id. (emphasis in original). In addition, the court found that the owners
were subject to "very substantial penalties" for delays in remitting the tax. Id. The court
then stated that these factors were also present in other decisions in which the supreme
court found taxes were de facto occupation taxes. Id. (citing Community School Dist.
No. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 95 Ill. 2d 244, 254-55, 447 N.E.2d 345, 348-49 (1983);
Commercial Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45, 66-67, 432 N.E.2d 227, 229
(1981)).
170. Id. The court also addressed a City of Chicago revenue ruling that interpreted
the Amendment to require only that owners make a good faith effort to comply with the
Amendment to avoid penalties. Id.; CITY OF CHICAGO Rev. Rul. 86-1 (Feb. 17, 1986).
The court found that the revenue ruling was "intended to respond to an argument that
the substantive burden of the tax herein is that of an occupation tax." Chicago Health
Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 11, 528 N.E.2d at 982. The court concluded that "[a] self-serving
administrative ruling obviously cannot amend an ordinance to save it from constitutional
infirmities." Id.
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that even if the tax was imposed on health club owners, it was not
an occupation tax because it was also imposed on any persons pro-
viding the stated services, regardless of whether they owned a
health club.' The court dismissed this argument, stating that
"the city has gone far beyond merely taxing particular activities
and has imposed a tax unique to those types of commercial enter-
prises." 172 The court stated that a tax on membership fees to
health and racquetball clubs is a tax on those occupations. 17 3
Having concluded that the tax in question was an occupation
tax, the court considered whether the occupation tax was author-
ized by the legislature.'74  The defendants argued that if the
Amendment created an occupation tax, then the tax was author-
ized by the legislature as an amusement tax.7 5 The court noted
that a tax could not be imposed on establishments as places of
amusement unless the establishment is "at least predominately en-
gaged in offering amusement activities."'' 7 6 In addition, the court
recognized that activities such as tennis, 177 horse racing, 78 amuse-
ment parks, 7 9 and movie theaters 8 0 are capable of being taxed as
amusements.'
8
'
171. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 11, 528 N.E.2d at 982.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 12, 528 N.E.2d at 983. The Illinois Constitution prohibits home rule
units, such as Chicago, from imposing income based taxes or occupation taxes unless they
are authorized by the legislature. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e)(2). See supra note 133.
175. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 12, 528 N.E.2d at 983. The defendants
relied on section 11-42-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code, which states that "[t]he corpo-
rate authorities of each municipality may ... tax.., amusements and may... tax ... all
places for amusement." Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-42-5 (1987)). The
defendants claimed that paragraph 11-42-5 authorizes a tax on health club memberships
as a tax on amusements, even though not all activities conducted at the clubs are amuse-
ments. Id. The defendants' reasoning was that paragraph 11-42-5 "authorizes a tax not
only on amusements but also on places of amusement." Id. (emphasis in original). The
court stated that this argument was irrelevant because the Amendment did not attempt to
tax the clubs as places of amusement; rather, the Amendment included the activities at
health and racquetball clubs within the definition of "amusements." Id. Nevertheless,
the court analyzed the defendants' argument that the Amendment taxed the clubs as
places of amusement. Id. at 12-13, 528 N.E.2d at 983.
176. Id. at 13, 528 N.E.2d at 983 (emphasis original).
177. See Greater Chicago Indoor Tennis Clubs, Inc. v. Village of Willowbrook, 63
Ill. 2d 400, 349 N.E.2d 3 (1976).
178. See Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 Ill. 2d 10, 357 N.E.2d
1118 (1976).
179. See Isberian v. Village of Gurnee, 116 Ill. App. 3d 146, 452 N.E.2d 10 (1st Dist.
1983).
180. See Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria, 77 I11. 2d 491, 397 N.E.2d
790 (1979).
181. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 14, 528 N.E.2d at 983.
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The supreme court, however, differentiated the tax on health
club memberships from taxes on other amusements." 2 The court
based this distinction on the fact that health club memberships
cover a variety of amusement, as well as non-amusement activi-
ties.'" 3 As a result, the court concluded that health clubs do not
engage predominantly in amusements and, thus, cannot be taxed as
places of amusement." 4 The court, therefore, held that the circuit
court properly granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction, and
remanded the case for further proceedings.8 5
Justice Ryan specially concurred with the majority opinion, con-
sidering the case in light of Illinois Gasoline Dealers Association v.
City of Chicago."8 6 In Illinois Gasoline Dealers, the supreme court
held that even though gasoline dealers were responsible for the col-
lection of a fuel tax, it was not an occupation tax.8 7 Justice Ryan
believed that, on the surface, these cases seem inconsistent.18 8 Ac-
cording to Justice Ryan, the key factor in considering whether a
tax is constitutional is to look first to the relevant constitutional
provision. 189 Based on the debates at the constitutional conven-
tion, Justice Ryan contended that a clear intent had been expressed
to allow a tax on the transfer of tangible items but not on serv-
ices.' 9° The convention delegates wanted to prohibit home rule
units from imposing additional income based taxes, and they ex-
pressed concern that the effect of any tax on services would be the
same as a tax levied or measured by income.' 9 The debates, how-
ever, stated that a tax on the retail sale of a tangible good is a
182. Id.
183. Id. at 13-14, 528 N.E.2d at 983. The court admitted that health clubs offer
amusement activities such as tennis and racquetball. Id. The court also found that
health clubs offer a variety of non-amusement activities, such as nutritional instructions,
weight loss counseling, diet counseling, cardiovascular examinations and counseling, and
instruction in weightlifting and other physical fitness activities. Id.
184. Id. at 14, 528 N.E.2d at 983.
185. Id. at 16, 528 N.E.2d at 984-85.
186. 119 Ill. 2d 391, 519 N.E.2d 447 (1988).
187. Id. at 401, 519 N.E.2d at 451.
188. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 16-17, 528 N.E.2d at 984-85 (Ryan, J.,
specially concurring).
189. Id. at 17, 528 N.E.2d at 985 (Ryan, J., specially concurring). The Illinois Con-
stitution provides in pertinent part: "A home rule unit shall have only the power that the
General Assembly may provide by law... [to] impose taxes... upon occupations." ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § (6)(e).
190. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 16-17, 528 N.E.2d at 984-85 (Ryan, J.,
specially concurring).
191. Id. at 18, 528 N.E.2d at 987-88 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
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permissible home rule tax. 192 A tax on the retail sale of tangible
goods, therefore, is within permissible home rule taxing powers as
expressed by the convention; however, the power to impose a tax
on services was not intended by the convention. 193 Justice Ryan
continued that only after determining that the tax on health clubs
was not within the permissible home rule taxing powers expressed
by the convention does the practical effect of the tax become rele-
vant to determine whether it is an occupation tax. 194
The contrast between and the importance of Illinois Gasoline
Dealers and Chicago Health Clubs are succinctly contained in Jus-
tice Ryan's concurring opinion in Chicago Health Clubs. The
practical effect analysis of the Commercial National Bank court is
not appropriate in the case of a transfer of tangible property;
rather, it is applicable only when services are being provided. The
question of where the incidence of taxation falls becomes disposi-
tive only after it is determined that a tax is otherwise subject to the
limitations imposed on the taxing powers of home rule units. Only
after it is determined that a tax may be subject to such limitations
is the practical effect analysis of Commercial National Bank rele-
vant. It is useful to note that the practical effect analysis of Com-
mercial National Bank, in the area of occupation taxes, is
consistent with the philosophy underlying the four-prong test in
Complete Auto, which was applied by the court in Goldberg.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Goldberg decision is clearly the most significant tax case de-
cided by the supreme court during the Survey year. It is the first
decision in which an Illinois court has used the four-prong Com-
plete Auto test, thus rejecting earlier Illinois precedent. Coupled
with the supreme court's decision in Searle, during the prior Sur-
vey year, taxpayer litigation will begin to focus on the uniformity
clause of the Illinois Constitution and the greater protection it af-
fords over the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.
192. Id. (Ryan, J., specially concurring). See also 7 Record of Proceedings, SIXTH
ILL. CONST. CONVENTION, at 1655-56 (1970).
193. Chicago Health Clubs, 124 Ill. 2d at 17-18, 528 N.E.2d at 986-87 (Ryan, J.,
specially concurring).
194. Id. at 18, 528 N.E.2d at 985 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
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